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Computer viruses have threatened the integrity and reliability of
computer systems since 1983. Literally hundreds of viruses exist for the
IBM compatible computer alone. These viruses can cause corruption or loss
of program and data files, incidental damage to hardware, and degradation
or loss of system performance.
This paper examines the nature of the virus threat by discussing
virus types, methods and rates of propagation, relative frequencies of
occurrence, and genealogy.
Possible methods for virus detection and identification, followed by
disinfection, are outlined. Minimum capabilities and testing criteria for
these products are also detailed.
Methods for controlling and limiting infection and damage are
discussed. These are considered minimum acceptable safeguards to be
implemented by an organization.
Lastly, software authentication means are examined, which, when used
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Since the first infectious and destructive computer virus was created
1
,
in November 1983 , and the first microcomputer virus in January 1986", the
i
computer security field has never been the same." Computer viruses have
received wide reporting in both trade journals and the general press. Viral
code written in Asia could be "exported", via modem or mail, around the
world. Systems could be infected quicker than warnings could be received
and precautions taken. The recent, and much publicized, UNIX Worm and
AIDS Trojan incidents are but two examples of the damage malicious code
can do.
While conducting Doctoral Thesis research at the University of
Southern California in 1983 and 1984, Fred Cohen developed the first
computer virus and conducted propagation experiments on a VAX computer
with a UNIX operating system.
2 The virus, later named Pakistani Brain, originated in Lahore,
Pakistan. It was developed by two brothers purportedly as a copy
protection scheme for software they sold in their store. The original
version of this virus has their names and telephone number programmed
in the code.
For comparison, the IBM PC was announced in 1980 and went on sale
October 1981.
The Pakistani Brain spread rapidly to North American via Europe.
In less than twelve months it had infected nearly a half-million computers
in hundreds of universities, corporations and government agencies.
Cohen conducted five trial runs in which his virus never took more
than an hour to infect the VAX system. The shortest time to full infection
was five minutes, the average half an hour. His work was so successful
that university officials refused to allow further experiments.
The D .artment of the Navy (DON), in its drive toward technological
sophistication, is becoming increasingly computer dependant. Ships are
receiving administrative microcomputers and "smart" weapons systems while
shore establishments have their management information systems
interconnected by wide and local area networks (WANS and LANS). This
dependency and interconnection increases the potential of viral infection
and the threat of data compromise and degradation or loss of system
performance. Regardless of the source, a campus prank s ** or a foreign
power, protecting our systems from viruses will be ess. .lial to ensure
their reliability.
B. SOFTWARE CATEGORIES
Software used by DOD can be broadly categorized as either mission
critical or mission support. Mission critical software directly impacts on
DOD's ability to defend the United States from attack. Such software would
include missile guidance systems and military forces command and control
programs. Mission support software, ill other DOD software not di: :tly
effecting the defense of the United States, would include payroll packages,
personnel databases, and office automation.
Development of mission critical software often requires access to
classified hardware design and performance specifications. Depending upon
classification, special storage and development facilities, access t icedures,
and testing criteria may be employed. Additionally, the fielding of hardware
and software systems would most probably be performed through a secure
distribution channel.
Mission support software development will, in general, require access
to unclassified, or at most, unclassified but sensitive data". Many of the
restrictions for classified projects may not apply. Distribution of hardware
and software will be through the Central Design Agent (CDA), the standard
supply system or via open purchase. Unfortunately, this increases the
vulnerability of our systems since the relative percentage of word
processors procured by the Navy exceeds the number of missile guidance
programs.
Due to the comparatively open nature of development, the relative
percentages of procurement, and the underlying simplicity of the custody
chain, I chose to examine viral protection of mission support software.
C. MICROCOMPUTER RELIABILITY
The IBM compatible microcomputer's popularity, widespread availability,
and general lack of security has made it the target of most viral attacks
in the last five years. The threat has become so wide-spread that Allstate
Insurance Company now offers virus insurance. Its home and business
insurance policies have been extended to cover viral damage to
microcomputers. (Skulason, 1990, #3-35) These are the same systems which
have been used aggressively for office automation, command LANs, and
access to sensitive command and control systems such as the Worldwide
Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS).
The Computer Security Act of 1987, signed into law 8 January 1988,
created this category of information. It includes privacy act and contract
sensitive data.
With this in mind, I will focus on mission support software for IBM
compatible hardware only. Providing viral safeguards for these systems
is a first step toward overall computer system protection. The question
then, is "How do we provide protection from viral attack?".
I will broadly define a virus as any program which replicates and
spreads itself secretly. Assuming a given computer is not infected when
manufactured
,
the infection must occur during use. This implies the
3 4infection vector is the software which is then added to it by the user.
We can then narrow our research question to "How do we prevent the
loading of infected software?".
Before answering, we must understand the nature of the threat, the
types of existing viral detection and removal tools, and potential means of
protecting software. These issues will be addressed in the following
chapters.
This is not unrealistic since the vast majority of microcomputers
dedicated to mission support functions are IBM compatible. Indeed many
competitively bid procurement contracts have specified this compatibility
as a requirement.
A valid assumption since memory is empty and any disk drives are
empty or unformatted.
"An agent capable of transmitting a pathogen from one organism to
another either mechanically as carrier or biologically by playing a specific
role in the life cycle of the pathogen." [Webster's Third New International
Dictionary]
Commercial, shareware, or public domain only, since I assume a
software developer will not write code to deliberately infect and damage his
own system.
II. NATURE OF THE VIRUS THREAT
A. NAME ORIGIN
Virus is a normal Latin 2nd declension word meaning 'slime', 'poison',
and 'offensive'. While its first English usage was in 1599, it was not used
in its present meaning as 'filterable virus until 1880. [Oxford English
Dictionary, Second Edition] The invisible and destructive nature of the
biological virus led to its adoption as the name for its electronic cousin.
In fact, many researchers use terms reminiscent of the biological virus:
vector, infection rate, and vaccine. The plural of 'virus' as used in
English, is 'viruses'.'
B. TYPES OF VIRUSES
Computer viruses can be categorized in three major classes based
upon their area of system residence and/or infection:
• boot infectors
• system infectors
• executable program infectors
"An infectious organism, usually submicroscopic, that can multiply
inside certain living host cells. A non-cellular structure lacking any
intrinsic metabolism usually comprising a DNA or RNA core inside a protein
coating." [Oxford English Dictionary, Second Edition] It would pass through
filters that would stop bacteria.
Of note is the significant disagreement between academicians
concerning the 'true' plural of 'virus'. The first quarter of 1990 saw weeks
of electronic word war via the VIRUS DISCUSSION LIST and other research
oriented electronic forums concerning this point. For my part, I use
'viruses' throughout this work to represent the plural.
1. Boot Infectors
1 2These viruses reside in a disk's boot sector. If active in
memory, a boot virus will infect a new disk by relocating the boot sector
contents to a previously empty disk sector and marking it as bad in the
File Allocation Table (FAT). The virus then adds a jump instruction to its
end and writes a copy of itself to the boot sector. The jump ensures that,
after the boot virus is loaded into memory and executed during booting,
computer control is passed to the original boot code at it's new location.
An infec 4" disk can infect the system whenever the disk boot
sector is executed. While memory resident, these viruses can infect any
' DOS disks are organized using a rigid scheme. Each disk in a drive
is divided into one or more logical volumes. Each logical volume consists
of four areas: the boot sector containing configuration and bootstrap
information, an original and backup File Allocation Table (FAT) which holds
cluster chaining and ownership information, the disk root directory which
holds information pointing to the first cluster in the FAT chain holding a
given file's or subdirectory's data, and the file area which consists of
clusters maintaining file data chained by the FAT pointers.
The boot sector, logical sec contains critical inf> ation
regarding the disk medium such as: S iame and version, bytes/ sector,
sectors/cluster, number of reserved sectors, number of FATs, number of
root directory entries, total sectors in the logical volume, media descriptor
byte, number of sectors/track, number of disk drive heads, number of
hidden sectors, and the disk bootstrap to load the operating system from
disk (the ROM bootstrap is smart enough to home the disk drive head, read
the boot sector from disk, and jump to it in memory).
The "bad" sector marking in the disk FAT ensures that these
sectors will not normally be examined or altered by the system.
Boot infectors typically mark several "good" disk sectors as "bad".
These sectors are then used to hold the original boot sector code plus
whatever virus code would not fit in the boot sector.
A disk's boot sector is examined whenever drive hardware detects
a diskette change or upon system reset for logical drive only.
disk in the system. These viruses are fairly tame since they infect a given
disk only once and are relatively easy to find.
2. System Infectors
These viruses attach themselves to the command interpreter and
other system files that remain memory resident and reside on bootable hard
or floppy disks.' Except for exclusively targeting system files, these
viruses behave similarly to executable program infectors which are
discussed below.
While the relatively small number of systems programs should
make these viruses somewhat tame, the fact that systems programs remain
memory resident and are frequently called allow these viruses to cause a
high degree of infection in a short span of time.
3. Executable Program Infectors
These viruses are particularly troublesome since they can spread
2
to any executable program in the system by either appending or
overwriting. A virus generally appends itself to either the front or back
3
end of an executable file. Front end appenders situate their code so it is
The 8086/8088 family of microprocessors are designed so that, when
reset or powered up, program execution begins at memory address
0FFFF0H. This lies within ROM memory and contains a jump instruction to
the system power up self test (POST) and bootstrap code. The bootstrap
code loads and executes the system programs MSDOS.SYS and 10. SYS.
10. SYS ultimately loads and executes the command interpreter
C0MMAND.COM.
Z Any program ending with the suffix COM, EXE, OVL, or BIN is
considered by the operating system to be executable.
According to John McAfee, Chairman of the Computer Virus Industry
Association (CVIA) and President of McAfee Associates, a Santa Clara,
California based anti-viral research and marketing firm:
e> 3uted before the host program. After the virus performs 3 task, it
then returns control to the legitimate code. Back end appenders usuallv
add a JUMP instruction in the front end pointing to the viral code. Aft
virus execution, another JUMP points back to the original program code.
Overwriting viruses simply replace a section of the existing code with their
own instructions. This subgroup is usually detectable earlier in the
infection process since the host program may no longer function correctly.
The appenders may slow program performance but will generally escape
detection ';ntil the virus damage sequence is triggered.
This type virus usually accomplishes its infection by either:
copying itself to another executable file whenever an infected program
is executed and then passing control to the host program
by remaining memory resident and infecting each program that is
loaded into memory
During infection, the original file size, date, and time may be
changed. However, sophisticated viruses may save and restore the original
values when writing the modification to disk. Additionally, to avoid early
detection and maximize infection, the virus may avoid previ asly infected
"Viruses can attach to a program's beginning, end, middle, or any
combination of the three. They may fragment and scatter virus
segments throughout the program or keep the main body of the virus
unattached to the program, hidden in a bad sector. All known viruses,
however, [modify the program's beginning to] ensure the virus is
executed before the host. If this were not so, the uncertain
environment in which the virus executed would increase the
possibility of program failure [and early detection]. Viruses which
replace entire programs, such as boot infectors, and viruses that
attack only specific programs [such as system infectors], are the only
exception to the this rule. These viruses may gain control at any
point, since the structure of the host program is well known and the
environment can be predicted." (McAfee, 1989)
files or delay its damage sequence until infection has reached a
predetermined level.
C. PROPAGATION ESTIMATES
Estimates of viral multiplication rates are not easily obtained for many
reasons:
computer hardware may remain constant but software used and
preventative measures taken may vary greatly from site to site and
machine to machine
many researchers are reluctant to divulge their estimations since they
are often derived from reports concerning products they are
supporting
this information is still considered 'embarrassing' and 'sensitive'
Dr. Fridrik Skulason, virus researcher at the University of Iceland,
Technical Editor of the Virus Bulletin (UK), and consultant to the Naval
Computer Incident Response Team (NAVCIRT) at the Naval Electronic
Systems Security Engineering Center (NAVELEXSECCEN) in Washington, DC,
has, however, recently released estimates for two of the oldest and most
wide-spread viruses. These appear in Figure 1.
Total number of PCs 30.000.000 Machines
Number infected with Jerusalem 100.000-500.000 Machines
Number inf«ct«d with Brain 100.000-500.000 Machines
Figure 1 - Estimated PCs Infected with Jerusalem and Brain (Skulason, 1990, #3-64)
The Jerusalem and Pakistani Brain viruses are about 51 and 74
months old, respectively.
Figure 2 provides the amended estimate if each infection 1 on the same
machine is counted.
Nu«ber of Jerusalem infections 2.000.000-10.000.000 infections
Number of Brain infections 1.000.000- 5.000.000 infections
Figure 2 - EstiMted Jerusalen and Brain Infections (Skulason, 1990, #3-64)
Of note is the apparent virility of Jerusalem compared with Brain
even though Brain is a third older. This is primarily due to its targeting
of executable programs instead of the comparatively rare disk boot
se_ .ors.
Skulason hypothesizes that viral infections increase exponentially over
time but slow as the virus saturates the system. This can be seen in
Figure 3. His experience with organizational infections indicates that once
a virus infects a computer, it will usually spread organization wide in one
to two months. (Skulason, 1990, #3-64).
Skulason estimates that 20 infected programs reside on every
Jerusalem infected machine, and 10 diskettes have been infected by every
Brain infected computer.
According to John Mildner, head of the Naval Computer Incident
Response Team (NAVCIRT) at the Naval Electronic Systems Security
Engineering Center (NAVELEXSECCEN) in Washington, DC: "Jerusalem
probably spreads more rapidily since it uses executible files as the
infection vector. These files are often transfered electronically via bulletin
boards or computer networks. On the other hand, the virus most common
to the Navy, the Stoned boot sector virus, is spread by exchange of data
files on floppy diskette." (Mildner, 1991)
Organizations in Iceland are not that large - The Bank of Iceland
is one of the largest and had about 700 PCs as of mid 1990.
10
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Figure 3 - Percentage of Organization Infected vs Time (Skulason, 1990B)
Skulason shows that the number of infected computers will rise slowly
when the virus is first introduced, but, assuming favorable conditions , a
virus will infect 80% of the machines within 2 months. The virus will then
probably remain unnoticed for some time. Once detected, it is usually
removed swiftly, but, almost never completely. When it reappears a month
or two later, some preventive software is finally installed and the virus is
defeated.* (Skulason, 1990, #3-64)
D. RELATIVE FREQUENCY
A virus's frequency of occurrence is related to its propagation rate
and age. Viruses which propagate faster such as executable infectors will
Such as lack of preventive hardware or software, or significant disk
or program traffic between different computers.
This is the period in which the virus actively replicates without any
noticeable performance degradation or damage sequence.
Particularly if backup files loaded to recover lost data files have
been corrupted.
Skulason estimates that, in Iceland, about 5% of all PCs have been
infected with a virus. However, viewing single organizations, he either
finds no viruses or an 80% infection rate.
11
be seen more frequently than slower propagators like boot infectors.
Likewise, older viruses have had longer to establish themselves in the user
community and will be spotted more frequently than viruses which have
just been isolated. Figure 4 lists the relative frequency of viruses as






1813 (Jerusalem) 21* 5 X 15X
1704 15* 50 X 20X
Stoned 9^ 2 % 10X
1701 8* 5 w 5X
648 ienna) 7* 10X







Disk Killer < IX 2 X 5X
Lehigh 1 < IX
Sunday < IX
Sylvia < IX







figure 4 - Observation Frequencies (Chess, 1990) (Skulason, 1990, #3-91 ) (Swinner , 1 1
)
These figures indicate that at least 70 percent of the infections are
caused by half a dozen viruses. As of February 1991, 222 major virus
strains have been isolated. Therefore, more than 70 percent of infections
are caused by less than 3 percent of the known strains. This makes the
virus identification and removal problem much more manageable.
Joh McAfee identifies 10 viruses (Pakistani Brain, Jerusalem,
Alameda, Cascade, Ping Pong, Stoned, Lehigh, Den Zuk, Datacrime, and Fu
Manchu) which, he believes, represent 95 percent of reported infections.
12
Details of specific infection cases in the United States are provided
in Appendix A (McDonald, 1990). A chronology of the Dark Avenger virus,
as told by its author, can be found in Appendix B (Skulason, 1990, #3-97).
E. VIRAL GENEALOGY
As the number of viruses increase, so does the difficulty of tracking
their inter-relations. Figures 5 and 6 provide the genealogy for those












Figure 5 - Boot Infectors (Skulason, 1990, #3-89)
Like its biological counterpart, a computer virus tends to evolve and
mutate. This mutation is controlled by programmers who generate new
viruses from the source or disassembled code of older ones. This process
often precludes major changes or enhancements and may assist identifying
new viruses soon after they appear. Appendix C (McAfee, 1991) details
i
infection and damage characteristics for known IBM compatible viruses."
A recent development, however, has been the use of self encryption
to hide and avoid detection.
2 As of 26 February 1991.
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Virus- -Virus-101
fig- .a 6 - Executable Program Infectors (Skulason, 1990, #3-89)
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III. VIRUS IDENTIFICATION AND REMOVAL
A. IDENTIFICATION
Virus identification can either be inadvertent or deliberate. For the
average PC user, viruses are unknown or something that infects 'others'.
Either way, little or nothing is done to catch infection before the damage
sequence is initiated. Infection is inadvertently discovered when the virus
triggers, performs its destruction, and possibly identifies itself.
Deliberate identification involves the active use of various software
tools tailored to locate, identify, and, perhaps, remove viruses. These tools
fall into three major categories:
• programs which prevent infection
• programs which detect infection after it has occurred
• programs which identify pre-existing infection
John McAfee, Chairman of the Computer Virus Industry Association
(CVIA) and President of McAfee Associates", a Santa Clara, California
based anti-viral research and marketing firm, points out that:
"These products, however, are not always clearly separable in the
marketplace. Some combine two or more programs, each addressing a
CVIA is reputed to consist of 95 percent of the anti-viral community.
Most of the members are vendors of anti-viral products. It is a source of
anti-viral programs and general virus information. Additionally, it is one
of the few groups providing cross system (IBM, Macintosh, etc) information.
McAfee products are discussed in this paper for illustrative
purposes only. This does not represent endorsement by the author or the
Department of the Navy. They represent the entire product spectrum.
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single protection area, into a single package. Others may focus on a
single type of protection but only provide a partial solution. For
example, there exist infection detection products that will only detect
changes to operating system files, ignoring all other executable code."
(McAfee, 1989)
Minimum capabilities and evaluation procedures for these tools have
been defined by the CVIA and are listed in Appendix D and E, respectively
(McAfee, 1989). Appendix F lists some of the commonly used anti-viral
products and their vendors.
1. Infection Preventors
These programs normally monitor the system watching for
characteristic viral activities'. If detected, they suspend activity, alert the
user, and offer to terminate the suspect program.
The primary benefit is that all suspicious activity will be caught
and viruses will not infect the system or spread. This means that strain
identification and removal is not required. Conversely, the drawbacks
include numerous interruptions to valid programs using these system
Such as absolute sector disk I/O, disk I/O to systems files, and
altera in of interrupt vectors.
' With the exception of boot infectors. No software technique can
prevent initial infection from a boot virus.
McAfee believes these programs require a user with a "fair amount
of technical competence" to discriminate between legitimate program activity
and a eal virus threat.
"Some applications modify their executable modules during the
configuration phase. Compilers, assemblers and linkage editors
legitimately modify or replace executable code. The DOS SYS command
will legitimately modify the boot sector and operating system files.
These and other programs may cause anti-viral products to flag the
activity and notify the user. The user must have sufficient knowledge
of the program or activity in process to determine whether to allow
it to proceed or to terminate it. Many system users do not have the
necessary technical depth to make a valid decision" (McAfee, 1989)
16
calls, user de-sensitization due to false positives , and reliance on the
virus being 'well behaved'".
These products should be tested, prior to use, to determine the
degree of protection afforded executable files and the product's sensitivity
to valid activities which might appear suspicious.
2. Infection Detectors
Detection products operate by vaccination or status logging.
Vaccinators modify executable code to include a self test module which
generates a run-time warning whenever the code has been modified. Status
loggers create a baseline file containing key file information (sizes, dates,
checksums, etc.) and routinely recheck this information to see if it has
changed. If a modification is discovered, a warning message is given to
indicate the areas of infection. In both methods the key assumption is that
the system is not infected prior to installation.
If the product flags too many legitimate activities, the user becomes
conditioned to respond with 'continue' without reading the warning.
The assumption that viruses perform I/O through system calls or
software interrupts is reasonable because it allows execution on a wide
variety of hardware. John McAfee, however, notes that some virus
designers are:
"taking the extra effort, and running the increased risks, of
interfacing directly to the hardware input/output devices. By doing
so, they completely neutralize the infection prevention products'
interrupt monitoring. No matter how cleverly software interrupts are
trapped, or memory monitored, it is ineffectual if the virus never
gives up processor control through an operating system call."
(McAfee, 1989)
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Advantages include checking at boot time instead of program
execution and avoidance of interrupt monitoring . Drawbacks include on
line baseline file maintenance making it vulnerable to tampering, the
necessity of strain identification and disinfection, and the assumption that
the system is infection free when the baseline is generated. A serious
drawback of vaccination products is that they can not detect viruses that
replace code rather than modify it since any vaccination code would never
Ihave an opportunity to execute.
Since these products identif infection after it has occurred,
testing should be conducted, prior to use, to determine if they can detect
modifications to executable programs such as the boot sector, the operating
system, or an application program. John McAfee explains that:
"Many detection products use the virus attachment profile to
speed system checking. If every byte of every program is
processed in some comparison technique global checking may take
some time. Systems containing many hundreds of large programs,
may require anywhere from 5 to 15 minutes to complete the
audit. Since a global scan should be performed at least daily,
this time requirement is a significant nuisance to the average
user and a deterrent for the implementation of the product.
Products that only look for the characteristic initial instruction
modifications, on the other hand, would complete the same audit
in a matter of seconds." (McAfee, 1989)
3. Infection Identifiers
Identification products scan a system using signature byte strings
to uniquely identify disk or file infection and may often provide
Regardless of a virus's sophistication, some executable code will have
changed after infection.
j
Boot sector viruses, for example, replace the boot sector with
themselves.
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disinfection and recovery assistance. Their primary function, however, is
identification.
The main benefits are the lack of assumptions and the relative
speed of execution. The main drawback is the almost constant stream of
new product releases" required as new viruses are isolated and old ones
mutate .
John McAfee describes the development of identification products:
"The virus must first be discovered and isolated. Then it must be
disassembled and analyzed. Finally an effective countermeasure must
be designed, implemented, and distributed to the public. The time lag
for this process is a few months to a year or more. This window of
opportunity for new virus developers will be a continuing barrier for
such products." (McAfee, 1989)
These products can best be evaluated by their success at
removing an actual infection.
B. REMOVAL
Fortunately for the microcomputer user community, if viral infection
can be identified prior to the initiation of the damage sequence, a virus
can usually be removed without loss of data or program files. Two general
categories of disinfection products exist:
• products which remove a specific virus or group of viruses
• products which remove all viruses
They can determine if a system is clean prior to installing a
prevention or detection product.
McAfee releases a new version of VIRUSCAN about every 3 months.
Viral researchers must then identify a signature byte string which
uniquely identifies it. That signature string must be included in the next
release of the anti-viral product.
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1. Virus Specific Disinfectors
These products are able to target a specific virus strain or group
of strains for removal. They are often included with, or as part of, a
2detection or identification product. Authors of these programs frequently
release revisions as new or mutated viruses are isolated.
As elsewhere, terminology is a point of contention within the anti-
virus industry. With luck, the following terms will become industry
standards:
signature string: a uence of bytes used by anti-viral programs to
check if a program infected
identification string: a sequence of bytes used by a lrus to check
if a program is infected
2. Universal Disinfectors
A universal virus detector and disinfector (UVD) would detect and
remove viral infections both known and unknown. This, of course, depends
on our ability to define viral activity under all circumstances.
We can appreciate the probl^ by refining our virus definition.
Fred Cohen defined a virus as "a program that can infect other programs
As of February 1991, 217 major virus strains exist. If modifications
to these viruses are cour d, there are 475 known IBM PC viruses.
McAfee's VIRUSCAN can remove many of the most common viruses.
The disinfection product CLEANUP is also provided to remove all viruses
which VIRUSCAN is capable if identifying.
John McAfee releases a new version of CLEANUP about every 3
months.
The termt have been defined as used by IBM, - it f they have been
used interchangeably by other researchers.
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by modifying them to include a slightly altered copy of itself" (Cohen,
1984). Unfortunately, this remains valid only if modernized as follows:
"program" should also include boot sectors, INITs and all other forms
of executable code
"include" must also cover viruses that overwrite the victim and may
destroy it completely
"slightly altered" is inaccurate. One can imagine a virus' that




Display ' This is a copy utility"
Display ' Name of input file ?"
Input In- File
Display ' Name of output file ?"
Input Out -Pile
Copy In-( ile t o Out-Pile
End
figure 7 - Copy Utility Pseudo-Code (Skulason, 1990, #3-24)
. Skulason details a program with three parts:
• Part A contains the main program
• Part B contains program locating and memory residency procedures
• Part C contains I/O routines.
Assume PI contains A+B and P2 contains A+C. Singularly, since they are
unable to replicate, they are not viruses. When executed, PI and P2 will
not infect other programs. PI will hide B in memory and execute the
original program. P2 can check if B is present in memory. If so, A, B and
C are combined in memory and executed. This new program uses B to find
more programs to infect, using C, with A+B or A+C. The program A, B and
C is a virus. However, it includes inert code instead of a slightly altered
copy of itself in other programs. The virus only activates when its parts
are combined. (Skulason, 1990, #3-24)
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If we tell PI the input fil s itself and some existing progr an is
the output file, PI will behave, and be classified, as an overwriting virus.'
PI, however, is not a virus since:
• It asks for the name of source and target files; and,
• It destroys the victim instead of executing it after the virus.
Objection 2 may not be valid, however, since this is how some existing
viruses work. (Skulason, 1990, #3-24)
Consider Figure 8.
Program P2
Display "Naae of output file ?"
Input Out-Pile
Copy P2 to Out- Pile
Knd
Program P3
Display "Naae of input file ?"
Input In-Pile
Select Out-Pile at random
Copy In-Pile to Out-Pile
End
Prograa P4
Select Out-Pile at random
Cop ?4 to Out- Pile
2nd
figure 8 - Potential Virus Pseudo-Code (Skulason, 1990, #3-24)
We want a UVD to identify P4 as a virus. It should also indicate
that P2 and P3 might be virus like in some circumstances. Unfortunately,
As well as most operating systems since they 'infect' other programs
in the same way. A compiler used to compile a copy of itself would also
qualify.
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determining those circumstances is where the difficulty arises.' (Skulason,
1990, #3-24)
Assuming that the examined program and it's environment are of
finite size, I/O operations transfer finite amounts of data, and the UVD
program runs on a different machine, a UVD may be possible but only on
a machine many orders of magnitude more powerful than that running the
examined program. If the first is a Sinclair ZX80, with IK of memory, the
second would need to be more powerful than all current super computers
combined. (Skulason, 1990, #3-24)
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IV. VIRUS INFECTION PREVENTION ME^MODS





The basic building block of security is user training. Hardware and
software can not protect a user from himself. A solid foundation in anti-




Most viral damage can be easily prevented by simple user
precautions:
• boot only from write protected copies of the distribution diskette
• if the system has a hard disk, never boot from a floppy disk
• set file attributes to read only on as many executable files as possible
to help prevent spread of infection
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• consider public domain, shareware, and borrowed software infected
until proven clean
• watch for changes in system activity such as increased disk accesses,
unusual error messages, lost disk space, disk access at odd time,
decreased available memory, slow response, or unusual screen displays
or sounds
• in a network environment, load proven software to a file server and
set file attributes to read only
• do not use master/distribution diskettes as working diskettes
• keep master/distribution diskettes in a safe place, away from the
computer working area
• make frequent backups of changing data files
2. Virus Recognition
A Virus Simulation Suite is available to mimic the visual and
audible effects of the most common microcomputer viruses. Like their
infectious counterpart, these programs are terminate and stay resident
routines. Unlike the real virus, however, they can be turned on and off
by the user and are not infectious. Some have a programmable delay,
usually in minutes, to simulate the replication period. Simulations currently
available include:
Actually, the same holds for shrinkwrapped commercial software.
Shrinkwrap does not mean virus free. It is most frequently used in
conjunction with the licensing language, i.e., breaking the shrinkwrap
means agreement with the terms of the license. Package encapsulation to
reduce the risk of loss or contamination and increase the probability that
tampering will leave evidence is an incidental benefit.
The Virus Simulation Suite is written and maintained by Joe Hirst
at the British Computer Virus Research Center, 12 Guildford St, Brighton,







These simulations could help develop viral activity recognition in
users.
B. HARDWARE MEASURES
Virus protection, as in many areas of computer security, may be
possible, but, certainly not foolproof, without hardware assistance. Many
incidence of viral infection could be reduced or eliminated by the
introduction of a few hardware elements of varying cost:
• write protect tabs
• tamper-proof shrinkwrap
• CD ROM
1. Write Protect Tabs
These devices are inexpensive and easy to use. Most computer
systems, and certainly those manufactured in the last five years, implement
disk write protection in hardware vice software. Since this hardware
inhibits disk writing if the tab is in place, viruses can not corrupt a write
protected disk. Write protect tabs should be on all floppies put in a
system.
The hard drive or a dedicated flopp :ould then be used for output.
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Original distribution diskettes should be write protected as soon as
removed from the shrinkwrap and either installed on the hard drive or
diskcopied to other floppies to make a working copy of the software.
2. Tamper-proof Shrinkwrap
Unfortunately for the buyer, many software stores have the
capability to re-shrinkwrap software which has been purchased and
returned or used for showroom demonstration. While this makes the product
once again available for sale, it does nothing to protect the buyer from
diskettes which were infected by the machine on which they had been
previously used. To preclude this unsuspected hazard, tamper-proof
shrinkwrap, perhaps bearing the vendor's corporate logo, could be used.
Opening and resealing of software could be immediately determined by
inspection.
3. CD ROM
Since systems are infected by using infected software, the most
certain means of preventing infection is using only software which is
certified virus free. We must then ensure it is never unintentionally
modified. One method is the exclusive use of software on CD-ROM. This
optically read storage medium, while much slower and more error prone
than electrically read magnetic media, is forever inscribed with the digital
data representing program and data files. All program output would be




The last software method for combatting viruses includes tuo types
of measures:
• virus scanners which search for viruses in memory and on disk
• software which authenticates user software prior to use from a known
true baseline
1. Virus Scanners
Virus scanners are programs which search computer memory and
disk storage looking for signature byte strings characteristic of known
viruses. As previously discussed, there are three major categories:
• programs which prevent infection
• programs which detect infection after it occurs
• programs which detect pre-existing infection
2. Authentication Methods
Software, both commercial or government produced, is shipped
from vendors to either retailers or users. While undergoing development,
we assume that it is protected. However, while sitting in storage, or c .; the
user system itself, we consider it vulnerable. (Spafford, 1990)
Given this, we may develop a software authentication process
consisting of the following:
• the vendor generates digitally signed software
• the user verifies the signed software
• the user installs and customizes the software on his system
• the user digitally signs his installed copy
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• the user's system checks the executing software using hardware
and/or software authentication methods (Davida, 1989, p 313)
Hardware is generally more tamper resistant than software. The
same holds true for hardware based authenticators. The actual
authentication method used, however, will be decided based on the level of
security (degree of trust) required and the dollars available for procuring
this means.
The inherent vulnerability of software based security systems is
often compensated for by requiring complex access procedures,
sophisticated self verification, or booting from special software diskettes.
Unfortunately, this may be more than the average user will religiously
adhere to. Conversely, complex hardware based authentication systems
could be subverted by implanting malicious code into the IC chips during
the design process. This necessitates testing and validation of
authentication equipment by external means. Validation testing could be
eased by simple authentication hardware design since:
• chip complexity would be low
• chips could be procured from multiple sources making tampering
impractical
• multiple chip design would require the malicious code to be spread
across devices to perform its task
• chips older than computer viruses could be used (Davida, 1989, p 315)
Acknowledging this, the Department of Defense has recently started
work on its own semiconductor plant. This plant would produce "clean" IC
chips for use in sensitive equipment.
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The key problem then is the verification of the verifying means.
A possible solution is the use of cryptography and digital signatures to
'sign' a software package. The vendor signs his release or update and the
user authenticates the signature. Once validated, the software can be
installed, customized as required, and 'sealed' by the user using his own
digital signature.
A program may be checked when installed and each time it is
executed. The question of authentic." 4
- ion granularity, like the hardware
or software authentication issue, is .ne of degree. Determir ion of the
level at which to sign an executable, i.e., program, process, or instruction,
is a function of the degree of trust required, the speed of the
authentication process, the size of the executable, and the method used.
(Davida, 1989, p 317)
A complete check may not be possible if segments are only loaded
as needed. In timesharing environments a process is at risk whenever it
doesn't control the processor. Events such as paging, segmentation, or
process swapping open the code to tampering. Re-authentication would then
be required prior to regaining control.
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V. AUTHENTICATION METHODS
This section examines the theory behind several software
authentication methods broadly categorized as "digital signature"
generators. A digital signature is a property, private to a user or process,
that is used for signing messages. A reliable digital signature must satisfy
five requirements:
• the signature must be unique and be able to be generated only by
the user
• it must be computationally infeasible for authentic signatures to be
generated (forged) by unauthorized users
• any receiver of a digitally signed message (and any dispute
arbitrator) must be able to authenticate the signatures authenticity
even after a considerable period of time
• digital signatories must not be able to deny an authorized signature
as a forgery
• digital signatures must be cheap and easy to generate (Seberry, 1989,
p 155)
The digital signature, since it's non-forgeable, establishes sender
authenticity equivalent to a written signature.
This work advocates implementation of initial authentication means with
the least delay and cost possible. Therefore, the following methods, ordered
from the simple to the complex, were reviewed since they represented
existing, well understood, and easily implemented technology. They are:
• checksums
• cyclic redundancy codes
• encryption
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• message authentication codes
• hybrid systems
A. CHECKSUMS
The simplest and fastest form of digital signature is the checksum.
Checksums treat a file as a series of binary numbers. By summing all the
binary numbers, a checksum or total value can be found. Changes to files
can be readily determined by recalculating the checksum and c iring it
with the previous result.
A file changed by a virus will have an altered checksum unless the
virus tries to compensate. Unfortunately, it is quite easy to determine a
file's stored checksum and determine an additive byte string which
'corrects' the corrupted file's checksum. Therefore, checksums do not meet
requirement 2 for reliable digital signatures and are not sufficiently robust
to detect changes in the face of a clever attack.
B. CYCLIC REDUNDANCY CODES
Most commonly used for error detecting during data transmission,
polynomial or cyclic redundancy codes (CRC) can be used to detect changes
caused by viruses. CRC codes are generated using input bit strings as a
representation of a polynomial with coefficients of or 1. A n-bit message
or message segment is regarded as the coefficient list for a polynomial of
degree n-1 with n terms, ranging from x1 to x .
This method is used by many operating systems including DOS to
determine if reads and writes from and to disk have been performed
correctly.
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Polynomial arithmetic is performed modulo 2 and is functionally
equivalent to an exclusive or operation. Long division, using modulo 2
subtraction, can only be performed if the dividend has as many bits as the
divisor.
The CRC is computed by first selecting a generator polynomial of
degree r, G(x), with at least the high and low order bits set to 1. Next,
r zero bits are appended to the low order end of the n-bit message or
message segment so it now contains n+r bits and corresponds to the
polynomial x'M(x). The generator bitstring (the coefficients of G(x)) is then
divided into this new bitstring (the coefficients of x : M(x)) using modulo 2
division. The remainder is then subtracted from the x'M(x) bitstring using
modulo 2 subtraction. This resulting bitstring, polynomial T(x), is the new
message or message segment which is then sent. Upon receipt, it is divided
by G(x). If a remainder exists, a transmission error, or virus corruption,
has occurred.
Since this technique is more sophisticated than a checksum, it can
detect more subtle changes. Checksums rely solely on addition which is
insensitive to the order of the added numbers and can not detect byte
swapping. CRCs, however, can detect bit and byte swapping due to the
2
position dependent logic used. While most alterations will be caught, the
CRC method will not detect errors or corruptions corresponding to
polynomials containing G(x) as a factor. If G(x) contains two or more terms
Three polynomials have become international standards for G(x):
CRC-12, CRC-16, and CRC-CCITT.
CRCs are frequently used in floppy disk controllers in order to
determine whether information has been correctly retrieved from disk.
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(order r >1), all single bit errors will be discovered. By making x+1 a
prime factor of G(x), we can catch all errors consisting of an odd number
of inverted bits. Lastly, a CRC code with r check bits will detect all burst
errors of length <=r. Larger bursts have a (1/2) probability of being
unnoticed. (Tannenbaum, 1989, pp 210-211)
The bottom line is that requirement 2 for reliable digital signatures
is not met.
C. ENCRYPTION
Cryptograph se ciphers to tra. form standard f aintext messages
into secret ciphertext ones. This process, called encryption, and its
reverse, decryption, are controlled by one or more cryptographic devices
s
called keys.
Ciphers are typically classified in one of two general types:
transpositions or substitutions. The former rearrange data bits or message
characters while the latter replace bits, characters, or character blocks
with previously chosen substitutes. Most computer applications, such as the
National Instit e of Standards and Tec: -ogy (NIST) Digital Encryption
Standard (DES) use both techniques .
Cryptoanalysis is the science of cipher breaking. A cipher is
breakable if it is possible to determine either the plaintext or the key from
the ciphertext, or the key from plaintext-ciphertext pairs. There are three
basic methods used for attacking ciphers:




• chosen plaintext (Denning, 1982, pp 2-3)
A ciphertext only attack requires the determination of the key solely
from intercepted ciphertext, knowledge of the method of encryption,
purloined plaintext, knowledge of the ciphertext subject matter, and testing
for high frequency use words. The known plaintext attack method uses
knowledge of some plaintext-ciphertext pairs.' Ciphers should be accepted
for use only if they can withstand a known plaintext attack using an
arbitrary number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs. The last method, chosen
plaintext attack, is the most favorable for the cryptoanalyst. This attack
assumes possession of the ciphertext corresponding to selected plaintext.
A cipher is unconditionally secure if, no matter how much ciphertext is
intercepted, there is not enough information to determine the plaintext.
(Denning, 1982, pp 2-3)
While all ciphers are breakable given unlimited resources and time, we
need not develop them to withstand open-ended attack. A cipher which is
computationally infeasible to break will suffice. Computationally secure
ciphers can not be broken by systematic analysis with reasonable
resources and time.
Encrypted computer source programs is an example. The ciphertext
must contain certain keywords such as begin, end, loop, if, while, read,
write, etc. An educated guess as to their placement can be made and the
attack begun. The same can be done with the executable version of the
software if the equivalent machine instruction byte codes are known.
Databases have been identified as being particularly susceptible to
this type of attack if users can insert records into the database and then
observe the changes in the stored ciphertext.
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1. Cryptographic Systems
A cryptographic system has five components:
• a plaintext message space, M
• a ciphertext message space, C
• a key space, K
• a family of encrypting transformations, E»: M=>C
• a family of decrypting transformations, D*: C =>M (Denning, 1982, p 7)
A given encrypting or decrypting t: sformation is defined by an
algorithm common to the entire 'amily but using an unique key. For a
given key K, the decrypting transformation D, is the inverse of the
encrypting transformation E,, such that D, (E.(M))=M. The transformations
Ejj and D, are described by parameters called the encryption key and
decryption key, respectively. (Denning, 1982, p 8)
Cryptosystems must satisfy three general conditions:
the encrypting and decrypting transformations must be efficient for
all keys
the system must be easy to use
the security of the system should depend only on the secrecy of the
keys and not on the secrecy of the algorithms E or D (Denning, 1982,
P 8)
The first requirement is essential for a computer based application
since data encryption and decryption, usually performed at transmission
time, must not be a bottleneck. The second requirement implies it must be
easy for the cryptographer to find a key with an invertible transformation.
The last requirement implies that it should not be possible to break a
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cipher simply by knowing the method of encryption or the algorithm used.
(Denning, 1982, p 8)
2. Reasons for Cryptography




Secrecy requires that plaintext data be impossible to
determine from intercepted ciphertext:
it should be computationally infeasible to determine the decrypting
transformation D, from intercepted ciphertext C, even if the
corresponding plaintext M is known
it should be computationally infeasible to determine plaintext M from
intercepted ciphertext C (Denning, 1982, p 9)
Secrecy, therefore, requires only that the transformation D,
(the decryption key) be protected. (Denning, 1982, p 9)
b. Authen ticity
Authenticity requires that a false ciphertext C can not be
substituted for a ciphertext C without detection:
• it should be computationally infeasible to determine the encrypting
transformation E. given C, even if the corresponding plaintext message
M is known
• it should be computationally infeasible to find C such that D.(C') is
valid plaintext in the set M (Denning, 1982, p 9)
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Authenticity, therefore, requires only that the transf mation
E. (the encryption key) be protected. (Denning, 1982, p 9)
3. Types of Cryptosystems




These systems are also called one-key :eras since the
encrypting and decrypting keys are the same or easily derived from each
other. If both E. and D, are protected, both secrecy and authenticity are
ensured. Secrecy can not be separated from authenticity since making
either E, or D, public exposes the other. Therefore, all the requirements
for secrecy and authenticity must hold in one-key systems. (Denning, 1982,
P 10)
b. Asymmetric Cryptosystems
T ese systems are also called two-key systems with E. and
D. such that it is computationally infeasible to determine one key from
knowledge of the other. In another sense, E. and D. may be thought of as
one-way functions since they are easy to compute but computationally
infeasible to invert. This allows publication of one without endangering
the other. EL is protected for authenticity, while protecting D. wou Id
This means its very difficult to determine a pla ^.text message from
the ciphertext.
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ensure secrecy. This duality makes these cryptosystems ideally suited for
creating digital signatures. (Denning, 1982, p 11)
D. MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION CODES
Although these functions use cryptographic means to create a message
authentication code (MAC), I will discuss them separately from
cryptosystems. These ciphers are primarily used in applications where the
need is not the decryption of transmitted data but the determination of a
correspondence between a message M and ciphertext C. This
correspondence is tested by encrypting M and comparing the result with
C. Several types of MAC systems exist. I will examine the following:
• public keys cryptosystems
• message digests
1. Public Key Cryptosystems
The public key system, an asymmetric cryptosystem, allows two
users to hold both a public and private key and communicate with each
other knowing only the others public key.
User A has a public encrypting transformation (key) E. which may
be widely known, and a private decrypting transformation (key) D, which
is known only to him. While the public key is derived from the private key
by a one-way transformation, it is computationally infeasible to find D. (or
Computer logon passwords may be encrypted in this method. Since
they can not be decrypted, they are secure. Yet, when a user enters his
password at logon time, the transformation is applied and the encrypted
logon password is compared with the stored encrypted true password. If
they match, logon is achieved.
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its equivalent) from it. It is possible to apply these transformations or
keys to ensure three different outcomes:
• secrecy
• authenticity
• secrecy with authenticity (Denning, 1982, pp 11-12)
a. Providing Secrecy
If A wishes to send B a message, and knows B's public key
Eg, he can transmit M to B in secrecy by sending the ciphertext C = EJM).
On receipt, B decrypts C using his private key D
g
getting the plaintext
message M = Dn(C) = Dn(En(M)). While this process provides secrecy, it does
not provide authentication since any user with access to B's public key
could send a message to A or replace one with his own. (Denning, 1982, p
12)
b. Providing Authentication
For authentication, M must be transformed using A's private







Authenticity is provided since only A can apply the private key.
Unfortunately, secrecy is not provided since anyone with access to the
public key can obtain the plaintext. (Denning, 1982, p 12)
c. Secrecy with Authentication
To achieve both secrecy and authentication, A and B must apply
both sets of transformations. A first applies his private key on M to assure
authenticity C = D.(M). He then encrypts this with B's public key to
provide secrecy C = Ej(C') = E^D
k
(M)). (Denning, 1982, p 13)
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2. Message Digests
The public key system can generate a digital signature by using
the sender's private key. This results in a signed message which is,
however, twice the size of the original. To alleviate this, most techniques
make use of data compression before forming the signature. Here, we take
a N bit message and break it up into units of n bits (where n << \T ). The
transformation is then applied to each of these units with the results
combined to form a signature of n bits called a message digest. The key
is ensuring that computing identical digests for two different messages is
computationally infeasible. (Seberry, 1989, p 156)
Two message digest generator methodologies follow:
• hash functions
• the RSA Signature Scheme
a. Hash Functions
These are one-way functions which take variable size input
strings and return a fixed size unique output string. The primary use of
hash functions is to determine if there have been any changes made to a
file.
Application of one-way function F on a plaintext message M
yields a fixed size hash code H = F(M). If M is an executable program file,
H« = F(M) is its hash code. If M is altered in any way, a new hash code,
H = F(M'), will result. Thus, tampering can be detected by comparing the
new hash with the previously computed, and presumably correct, one.
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The property of one-way hash functions allowing their use
for authentication is the computational infeasibility of finding a secon ;
message M' that will generate the same hash code H as the original message
M. Because of this, a relatively small H, 128 to 256 bits in length, can be
used to authenticate very large files. (Merkle, 1989A)
Formally, secure one-way hash functions have four properties:
• F can be applied to an M of any size
• F produces a fixed size H
• given F and M, it is easy to compute H = I
• given F, it is computationally infeasible to find a different input M\
such that M <> M' and F(M) = F(M') (Merkle, 1989B)
Since practical application requires a known input size, the
hash code is normally developed in two steps. First, function F
?
is defined.
It is similar to F but accepts only fixed size inputs. Fn is used repeatedly
to construct F via bitwise concatenation. All properties of F hold for F 7
with the exception of the fixed input size. D 'cing M given H is now
equivalent to dete. ning the. key given the p text and the ciphertext.
(Merkle, 1989B)
b. The RSA Signature Scheme
The RSA scheme uses both the public key cryptosystem and
data compression to form a digital signature. Assuming A wishes to send
B a signed message M, he first shortens it using compression to arrive at
the message digest M
n
= F(M). Next, A encrypts the digest using his
Named as a supported algorithm in the NIST/' I Implementor's
Workshop Agreements of Dec 1989.
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private key to obtain the signature M» = Di^J = D^(F(M)). The message and
signature pair (M and M<, ) are then forwarded to B.
On receipt of M and NL, B reproduces the message digest by two
different methods. First, the digest is recreated from the signature by
applying A's public key Mr, = E^Mg). Then B produces his own copy of the
digest using the compression function (since it's public). If the digest
obtained from A's signature equals the digest B created, the signed M is
accepted as authentic.
E. HYBRID SYSTEMS
These systems generally use a combination of methodologies to optimize
the speed of computer processing versus level of trust. For example, a DES
based system makes major demands on a personal computer due to the
complex mathematics required for encryption. In order to speed the
processing from the user's viewpoint, a hybrid mixture of DES and CRC,
or other means, may be used. This usually results in a small percentage
of a file being examined with a sophisticated MAC, and the remainder
examined with a high speed CRC algorithm. Sophisticated cryptographic
techniques are used to assure that attackers can not predict which bytes
are examined by each method. Additionally, results of all cryptographic
calculations are carried forward into all subsequent calculations. This
In fact, actual bit manipulation is most often implemented in
hardware for both speed and security concerns.
" Perhaps the portion examined by the MAC would be the code
sections most frequently modified by viruses.
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results in a digital signature that is faster than a DES MAC and stronger
than a CRC. (Bosen, 1989, pp 7-9)
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VI. PRACTICAL SOFTWARE AUTHENTICATION
This section examines several commercially available products which
make practical use of the theory previously discussed.
• RSA's MD4 algorithm
• RSA's CHECK and SIGN programs
• Enigma Logic's VIRUS-SAFE
A. MD4
This package, programmed and maintained by Ronald Rivest of RSA
Data Security, has been placed in the public domain for review and
possible adoption as a standard. 1 MD4 inputs a message of arbitrary length
and produces a 128 or 256 bit message digest.
It is considered computationally infeasible to produce two messages
having the same message digest, or any message having a specified target
message digest." Although MD4 is relatively new, the security provided
should be sufficient, for implementing very high security hybrid digital
signature schemes based on MD4 and a public-key cryptosystem. (Rivest,
1990)
As have been the two previous MD family algorithms MD2 and MP3.
These were circulated throughout the industry as INTERNET RFC 1113 and
1114. MD4 has been distributed as RFC 1115.
RSA conjectures the difficulty of deriving two messages having the
same message digest is on the order of 2 operations, and that of any
message having a given message digest is on the order of 2" operations.
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The C version of the MD4 algorithm, listed in Appendix G, is coded for
a 32-bit word/8-bit byte machine and runs at 1450, 70, and 32 kBytes per
second on a SUN Sparc station, DEC MicroVax II, and 20MHz 80286,
respectively. (Rivest, 1990)
B. SIGN AND CHECK
RSA Sign & Check are two programs which allow users to sign files
with non-forgeable digital signatures and to che<- t. given signature's
validity. These signatures are based on the highly t ted RSA public key
cryptosystem whic: las withstood intensive mission critical commercial use
as well as fourteen years of vigorous challenge from the academic and
scientific communities.
C. VIRUS-SAFE
This product relies on three different methods for producing MACs:
• cyclic redundancy codes
• American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standard X9.9^
• International Standards Organizat . (ISO) standard 8731-^
VIRUS SAFE allows several methods of operation to optimize security
versus performance. The frequency and thoroughness of file examination
ANSI X9.9 describes a way of using DES to calculate a MAC which
is believed impossible to forge.
ISO 8731-2 is currently used in the international banking community
to authenticate funds transfer.
i
The thoroughness of file examination which makes unauthorized
modification impossible to remain undetected takes time and decreases
productivity.
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can be optionally set either during software installation or execution such
as:
• whether or not a file should be examined at all
• when to examine the file (at boot or execution time)
• how frequently to examine the file (every time, every other, etc)
• how thoroughly to examine the file (the ratio of MAC to CRC)
For example, someone using a word processor could opt for thorough
examination every 15th execution instead of each time it's used. A
programmer who infrequently uses a debugger may want to have it
examined every time it is used. The infrequent use means the productivity
impact is small, even if a thorough examination is performed. Other non
sensitive program and data files can be examined in a more routine manner,
such as, using a high speed algorithm when the computer is booted. This
approach could be up to ten times as fast, but, not offer the level of
security of a MAC. (Bosen, 1989)
On a 10 MHz AT, 100 kBytes can be authenticated in 3.2 seconds using
a hybrid DES and CRC algorithm. (Bosen, 1989)
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Earlier, I asked, "How do we provide protection from viral attack?".
I concluded the appropriate question should be, "How do we prevent the
loading of infected software?". In retrospect, the first question allows us
to define the foundation for the paradigm to answer the second.
Serious protection from viral attack should be implemented as a three-
fold program:
• user training
• virus detection and removal
• software authentication




These measures instill confidence in the user and organization that
computer viruses are not omnipotent programs written by omniscient
programmers. Instead, they are damaging, but common, nuisances which can
be recognized and defeated with a little effort and understanding.




• virus detection and removal
1. User Training
A solid foundation for further anti-viral efforts must be laid by
training computer users in two areas:
• basic precautions
• viral recognition
The basic precautions will provide good user practices to reduce
the impact of viral damage, slow infection spread, and, hopefully, eliminate
new infections. A user's ability to recognize viral symptoms, either by
suspicious activity or visual or audible cues is important. Recognition,
before the initiation of the damage sequence, will be damage and infection
limiting. Use of virus simulations will provide safe and realistic recognition
patterns.
2. Virus Detection and Removal
Once the user has developed sound prevention and identification
skills, active use of anti-viral products will help ensure a virus free
system. These products should be implemented in the following order:
• identification tools
• detection or prevention tools
The identification product will ensure all existing infections are
identified and removed. Then the virus detection or prevention product can
be installed to preclude new infections.
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These measures should be used as follows:
daily random checks of on-line software as a first line of defense
against viral infection
periodic deliberate checks against an off-line protected baseline to
verify the random verification means
B. ASSURANCE BUILDING
While the above measures will provide a strong damage and infection
prevention program, iitional m<- ire available which could strengthen
prevention measures and cover "rinses' in their use. These assurance
building measures should make use of the inherent security of digitally
signed software. This means, when preparing software procurement contract
specifications, organizations should require that vendors certify their





Several acknowledged methods currently ex for simple and
inexpensive sof' are authentic? 'ion:
Realistically, most people will not write protect floppy disks or use
virus checkers religiously.
This could be done in conjunction with the National Institute of
Standard and Technology which is currently developing a standard digital
signature for non-repudiation. Likewise, vendors such as RSA provide
respected products and act as agent for establishing and maintaining the
unique digital sigi re applied by each software package sold.
a digita signature should be produced on the vendor's
develops at syste u since it is assumed to be uninfected. This is not
unrealistic since infections of commercial programs to date have been
traced to the duplication hardware and not the development system.
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• use of a public key type signature product such as Sign & Check
• use of a one-way hash functions such as MD4
• use of multi-function products such as VIRUS-SAFE
The relative advantages and disadvantages of these methods include:
One-way hash functions do not require any information to, be kept
secret. Public key systems require one key be kept secret. 1
The public key system would not require creation of substantiating
documentation. The digital signature is either valid or not. If its not,
the software is not loaded. One-way hash functions, however, require
that a substantial paper trail of software valid hash codes be
maintained. Conformity of the hash code generated upon software
receipt, with the approved hash code maintained in the valid hash
codes documentation, is then required prior to installation.
The public key system is much simpler in application than the one-
way hash function method.
Public key system licensing costs several hundred dollars per site.
The one-way hash function code is in the public domain.
A multi-feature program could be used in the interim to validate
software while waiting for vendors to release digitally signed
software.
In the form of the digital signature creation algorithm. This is kept
secret by the vendor.
This includes all versions and mini-releases.
For this work, I assume that NAVELEXSECCEN, the Navy's anti-virus
command, will create and maintain this paper trail. They will select the
Navy standard hash function, apply it to all mission support software in
Navy's inventory, and release a NAVELEXSECCEN NOTICE detailing the
software package, version, manufacturer, and hash code. As new software
is procured or updates received, NAVELEXSECCEN will update and reissue
their NOTICE. Of course, hashing for new software could be required by
the procurement contact to relieve NAVELEXSECCEN of all but the initial
effort.
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C. THE BOTTOM LINE
A reliable anti-virus product must be robust enough to ensure its own
integrity, and sophisticated enough to check all executable files without
exception.
While evaluating schemes for detecting and preventing viral spread,
it is important to remember that viruses use the same system capabilities
available to users. Many products and precautions may be used to slow or
stop infection spread. Each, however, tends to reduce the computer's
utility. As long as we desire flexibility, viru will be able co exploit
legitimate system capabilities. As viral programmers become more
experienced and develop new techniques, distinguishing between legitimate
and viral activity will become an increasingly difficult problem.
This requires more stringent protection and verification schemes.
Their strength, however, should lie in the verification process and not in
protection or secrecy of the method. Since most, if not all, of the anti-viral
products available today have loop holes , we must shift our reliance from
these "oducts to a computationally secure methodology for absolute virus
free environments.
Since viral infection can be traced to the use of infected software",
the only efficient way to preclude infection is to prohibit the use of
tainted programs. The only trustworthy means of prohibition is to require
Whether it be software interrupt monitoring in the prevention
product, assumed clean baselines for the detection product, or known
signature byte strings for the identification product, viruses can exploit
the weaknesses of even the most sophisticated anti-viral program.
While the current generation of microcomputer viruses live mostly
in executable images, this may not necessarily be true in the future.
52




A. EXAMPLES OF DOS VIRAL INFECTION IN THE US
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B. CHRONOLOGY OF A VIRUS AS TOLD BY IT'S AUTHOR
The author of the Dark Avenger virus has distributed it's source as
well as a program, DOCTOR, to remove it. DOCTOR contains the following:
DOCTOR QUICK: Virus Doctor for the Eddie Virus Ver 2.01 10-31-89
(c) 1988-59 Dark Avenger. All rights reserved. DOCTOR /? for help
It may be of interest to you to know that Eddie ( aka "Dark Avenger") is the most widespread
virus in Bulgaria for the time being. However, I have information that Eddie is well-known
in USA, W. Germany and USSR too.
I started writing the viru9 in early September 1988. In those times there were no any viruses
written in Bulgaria, so I decided to write the first Bulgarian virus. There were some
different Eddie's versions:
VERSION 1.0, 31-OCT-1988
This version established the most important features of the Eddie virus. Staying resident
into high end of memory, it was infecting .COM and .EXE files, but only when executing them.
INT 13 hadn't been handled in any way. This version was damaging infected files only, rather
than infected disks. Also, there weren't any messages in it (I still wasn't choosed a naae
for it).
VERSION 1.1, 16-DEC-1988
In December I've decided to enhance the virus. This version could infect files during their
opening. For that reason, a read buffer was allocated in high end of memory, rather than
using DOS function 48h when needed. The disk was destroyed instead of the infected files.
VERSION 1.2, 19-DEC-1988
This added a new feature that causes (for example) coapiled programs to be infected at once
if the virus is resident. Also, the "Eddie lives..." message was added (can you guess why
exactly "Eddie"?)
VERSION 1.31, 3-JAN-1989
This became the most conaon version of Eddie. A code was added to find the INT 13 roa-vector
on many popular XT's and AT's. Also, other messages were added so its length would be exactly
1800 bytes. There was a subsequent, 1.32 version ( 19-JAN-1989 ) , which added self -checksum and
other interesting features that was abandoned because it was extremely buggy. In early March
1989 version 1.31 was called into existence and started to live its own life to all
engineers' and other suckers' terror. And, the last
VERSION 1.4, 17-OCT-1989
This was a bugfix for version 1.31, and added soae interesting new features. Support has been
added for DOS 2.x and DOS 4.x. for further information about this (the most terrible)
version, and to learn how to find out a program author by its code, or why virus-writers are
still not dead, contact Mr. Vessel in Bontchev (All Rights Reserved).
So, never say die! Eddie lives on and on and on... Up the irons!
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C. KNOWN VIRUS INFECTION AND DAMAGE CHARACTERISTICS
The information below, provided by John McAfee at CVIA, details the
major characteristics and number of variants, in parenthesis, of the known
IBM PC compatible virus strains.
A Infects Fixed Disk Partition Table-
9 Infects Fixed Disk Boot Sector +
3 Infects Floppy Diskette Boot
7 Infects Overlay Files +
6 Infects EXE Files +
5 Infects COM files +
4 Infects C0MMAND.COM *
3 Install Self in Memory*
]












; + Corructs Data Files
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X . X X X N/A
X X . . . 720
XXX , 555
X X . . . 2253
X X . X . 299
X X . X . 1480
XXX varv
X X . 492
XXX 1049
X X . 1815
XXX X . 3784
X X . 961
X X . 903
X X . X . 691
XXX 1306
X X . 528
XXX X . 777
x x . 1374
XXX X . 919
XXX 535
Overwrites
X X . 217
XXX X . 4625
X X . X . 143
X X . . 321
X X . X . 1600
X X . 961
X X . 830
X X . 529
X X . 516
XXX X . 2144
X X . 1049
X X . 575
X X . 133




Justice .XXX. XX... 1242
Hymn X X X X X X X . X . 642
Happv New Year . X X X X X XX... 1865
Destructor X X X X X XX. . . 1150
Leapfrog Virus . X ? X . . X X . X . 516
MGTU Virus (2) .XX. X X . X . 273
Nina .XXX. X X . X . 256
Lozinsky .XX. X X . X . 1023
BeBe . .XX. X X . X . 1004
Best Wish . X X X Jc X X . X . 1024
Beeper ( 2
)
. X . X . X X . X . 4S2
Parity .XX. X X . X . 441
Trust Me . XXX. X X . X . 417
USSR-948 . .i . .XX)£ X X . X . 94 8
USSR-711 i . . x . . X . X . 711
ISSR-707 . ; i. . X X . . X . X . 707
L'SSR-696 t . . X . . X . X . 696
USSR-600 . :C . X X . X . X . 600
USSR-394 i . X X . . X . X . 394
USSR-257 . :C . X X . . X . X . 257
USSR-256 . .(.XX. . X . X . 256
Christmas Violator . ? X . X X . X . . ????
Off Stealth x . x x x x : <. X X . X . 1689
Jeff .XX. X X . X . >i 828
Bloody! E X • . . :c Ji X ... X n/a
ZeroHunt x :C X . X . X X . X . n/a
Music Bug (3) . X . . . :C 1c X ... X n/a
Dot Killer XXX. XX... 944
Father Christmas . .XX. XX... 1881
3445 x :C X . X X X X X X . 3445
Mirror ( 2
)
. X . . X XX... 928
Polish-2 XXX. X X . X . 512
Polish 217 . .XX. X X . X . 217
Happy Day .XX. XX... 453
Monxla . .XX. XX... 939
USSR . :C . . . X XX. . . 575
Polimer . .XX. x x . x . 512
DataLock X . . X XX... 920
Carioca (2) . X . X . XX... 951
529 XXX. X X . X . 529
Spyer . X . X X X XX... 1181
Taiwan4 X X X X X X X . X . 2576
Keypress (3) . X X X X . X X . X . 1232
Casper . :(.XX. X X X X . 1200
1605 . X X X X X X X X . 1605
Violator (6) .XX. X X . X . 1055
Blood-2 . . . X . X X . X . 427
Wisconsin . :t . XX. X X . X . 825




Leprosy-B . .XXX Overwrites
Whale (3) x :C X X X X X X X X X . 9216
Invader (4) k x . x x x :i 1c X X X X X 4096
Scott's Valley I X . X X X X X X X . 2133
Anarkia (2) . X . X X X X X . X . 1813
Black Monday (2) . X X X X X X X X X . 1055
Nomenclature (4) . X X X X X X X . X . 1024
Anthrax - Boot (2) . X . . . . )c x x . x . n/a
Anthrax - File (4) . X X X X . X X . X . 1206
651 . X . X . . X X . X . 651
Paris . . X X X X X X X X . 4909
Leprosy ( 5 . X X X X X Overwrites
Mardi Bros. (3) . X . . . .XX X ... X n/a
1253 - Boot . X . . . x x :C X X X X . n/a
1253 - COM .XXX. . X X X X . 1253
AirCop (3) . X . . . X . X ... X n/a
400 (5) . X . X . X X . X . vary
PI (6) K X . X . X X X X . varv
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Ontario x x x x x . XX,,£ varv
1226 (3) X X X X X X X X . X 1226
V2100 (2) . X . X x . X X X X 2100
Plastique (9) . X X X X X X X . X 3012
Wo tan ( 2
)
. X X X X . XX.. 2064
Dooiti I . X . X X . X X X X 2504
Flip (4) X X X X X X X X X X 2343
Fellowship (3) . X . . X . X X X X 1022
Flash . X X X X . X X X X 688
1008 X X X X . . X X X X 1008
Stoned-II . x . . . . :£ :£ x . x . x n/a
Taiwan3 . X X X X X X X X X 2905
Armagedon ( 3
)
.XXX. . XX.. 1079
13S1 . . . . X X X X . 1381
Tinv ( 13
)
. .XX.. X X . 163
Subliminal (3) .XXX. . X X . 1496
Sorry .XXX. . X X . 731
RedX (2) . .XX.. X X . 796
1024 (2) .XXX. . X X . 1024
Joshi (4 J! . X . . . . X X 3c x . . x x n/a
Microbes . X . . . .XX X . .XX . n/a
Print Screen (2) . X . . . .XX X . .XX n/a
Form ( 2
)
. X . . . .XX X . . X X n/a
July 13th X . . . X . . X X X X . 1201
5120 (3) . . X X X X X X X X 5120
Victor (2) . X X X X X .XXX 2458
JoJo ( 3 . X . X . . XX.. 1701
W-13 (4) . . . X . . X X . 532
Slow (5) X X . X X X XXX 1721
Frere Jacques . X . X X X X X . 1811
Liberty (2) . X X X X X X X . 2862
Fish-6 (2) )I X X X X X X XXX 3584
Shake . X . X . . X X . 476
Murphy . X X X X X X X . 1277
V800 (3) j£ X X . X . . XXX none
Kennedy ( 3 ) . . X . X . . X X . 308
8 Tunes/1971 (2) . X . XXX X X . 1971
Yankee-
2
. . .XX. X X . 1961
June 16th . .XX.. XXX x 1726
XA1 X . . X . . XXX x 1539
1392 . X X X X . XXX 1392
1210 . X . X . . XXX 1210
1720 (3) . X . XXX XXX x 1720
Saturday 14th (3) . X . X X X XXX X
K< ea (4) : {. :t X . . 3c . n/a
V nn < 5 ) . . . . X . XXX 1074
I /ir . . . . X . XXX :c 3880
S- xno ( 3
)
. X . X . . XXX 2000
V^JOO (3) . X X X X X XXX 2000
1359 . X X X X . XXX 1554
512 (5) :C . X X X . . XXX none
EDV (2) it . X .... 3£ 3C 3C X . . 2c n/a
Joker .XXX. . X X .
Icelandic-3 . X . . X . X X . 353
Virus-101 x x x x x x :£ . X . 2560
1260 (3) X . . X . . . X . 1260
Perfuse (2) . . . X . . . X . 765
Taiwan (3) . . . X . . . X . 708
Chaos . x . . . . : (. .£ x . . :t .£ ;£ n/a
Virus- 90 . x . x . . . X . 857
Oropax ( 5
)
. x . x . . X X . 2773
4096 (4) JC . X X X X X x x x x 4096
Devil's Dance (2) . X . X . . X X X X 941
Amstrad (5) . . . X . . . X . . 847
Payday ( 2 . X . XXX . X . 1808
Da taeniae II-B X . X X X . . X . 3c 1917
Sylvia/Holland . . . X . . . X . 1332
Do-Nothing . X . X . . X . 608
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Sunday (4) . . x . XXX. . X X . 1636
Lisbon (2) > X . . . , . X . 648
Typo/Fumble . X . X . . . . X X . 667
Dbase . X . X . . . . xx.;i . 1S64
Ghost Boot . . X . . . . X X X . . . X n/a
Chost COM X . . .
. . X X 2351
New Jerusalem . . X . X XX. . X X 1308
Alabama (3) . X . X . . . X X X 1560
Yank Doodle (6) . X . XX. . . X X . 2885
2930 . X . XX. . . . X . 2930
Ashar . X . . . . X . X n/a
AIDS (4) . . . X . . . . Overwrites
Disk Killer (4
)
. X . . . . X X XX..i X .t n/a
1536/Zero Bug . X . X . . . . X X . 1536
MIX1 X . . X . . . X X 161S
Dark Avenger ( 4
)
. X X XXX. . XXX 1300
3551/Svslock X . . XX. . . . x . ;< . 3551
VACSINA (5) . X . XXX. . X X . 1206
Ohio . X . . . . X . X n/a
Tvpo Boot . X . . . . X X X . . X n/a
Swap Boot . X . . . . X . X n/a
Datacrime-2 (2) X . . XX... . X . : 1514
Icelandic II . X . . X . . . X X . 661
Pentagon . . . X . . . . n/a
Traceback ( 3
)
. X . XX... . X . 3066
Datacrime-B X . . X . . . . . X . . }c 1168
Icelandic (2) . X . . X . . . x x . 642
Saratoga . X . . X . . . X X . 632
405 . . . X . . . . Overwrites
1704 Format X X . X . . . . X X . . >[ 1704
Fu Manchu ( 4 . X . XXX.. X X . 2086
Datacrime (2) X . . X . . . . . X . . >[ 1230
1701/Cascade X X . X . . . . X X . 1701
CASCADE-B (9) X X . X . . . . X X . 1704
Stoned (5) . X . . . . x . :i X . X X n/a
1704/CASCADE X X . X . . . . X X . 1704
Ping Pong-B (2) . X . . . . X X X . . X n/a
Den Zuk ( 3 ) . X . . . . X . X . . X . n/a
Ping Pong ( 5 ) . X . . . . X . X . . X n/a
Vienna-B X . X . . 648
Lehigh . X X . X . . ;c Overwrites
Vienna/648 (23) X . . . . . X . . 648
Jerusalem-B X . XXX.. X X . 1808
Alameda (2) . X . . . . X . . X . n/a
Friday 13th COM . . . X . . . . . X . 512
Jerusalem ( 17
)
. X . XXX.. XX.. 1808
SURIV03 . X . XXX.. X X .
SUBIV02 . X . . X . . . XX.. 1488
SURIV01 . X . X . . . . X X . 897
Brain (3) . X . . . . X . . . . . X . n/a
Total Known Viruses - 481
LEGEND:
Size Increase:
N/A - Virus does not attach to files.
None - Virus does not change size (attaches to file end)
Overwrites - Virus overwrites beginning of file, no size change






D. ANTI-VIRAL PRODUCT MINIMUM CAPABILITIES LIST
The minimum capabilities in the sections below are recommended by
John McAfee at CVIA. They can be used to provide a rough cut on
prospective anti-viral products. Acceptable products should then be
evaluated using the testing criteria in Appendix E.
1. Infection Prevention Products
Differentiate between activities initi i by the user and activities carried out
autonomously by urograms. Users may dele sr update program files or operating system
segments. An ^plication program, on .e other hand, should not, under normal
circumstances, modify another application program, an operating system program, or the
system's boot sector. This is indicative of viral activity;
Provide few false positives, or false alarms. Users become habituated to frequent false
alarms and tend to overlook a valid virus warning when it does occur;
Run with other memory resident programs. Infection prevention programs are all memory
resident and they modify a large number of software interrupts. This gives such
programs a propensity for crashing or hanging the system when running concurrently with
other memory resident programs;
Protect against modifications to all executable data, including: the system's boot
sector, device drivers, operating system modules, including hidden file programs, and
all application programs;
Provide an easily accessible enable/disable switch. Many instances will occur where the
checking process will need to be temporarily suspended;
Provide the ability to selectively protect or ignore specific programs or specific
areas of the system. This will reduce the number of false alarms when running programs
which violate the "rules" imposed by the product;
Provide the ability to freeze virus activity when it is detected, and prp' ^nt the
illegal access from continuing. This is mandatory to prevent the virus from ecting
the system;
Run without noticeably degrading system performance. Memory resident programs have a
tendency to increase system overhead and thus slow down the system. A well designed
product should cause no more than a 5% degradation in system performance;
Monitor and protect all attached read/write devices. All attached devices that can be
written to are potential virus targets. The prevention product should protect all such
devices; and,
Selectively prevent interrupt level I/O and non-standard calls for I/O service
(interrupt level requests). Since doing so increases the false alarm rate, the user
should have the choice of allowing or disallowing such calls.
2. Infection Detection Products
Detect characteristic viral modifications to execut :e data, including: the system's
boot sector, system device drivers, operating systeta modules, including hidden file
programs, and all application programs;
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Allow the user to selectively exclude specific programs or areas of storage from
checking. This will allow programs or directories that, undergo frequent change to avoid
causing error messages;
Perform global check functions tn a timely fashion. If the check function is executed
at boot time, for example, it should add no more t'lan 10 seconds to the boot sequence
for each 50 programs on the disk that must be checked;
Provide automatic checking. The check function should execute at least each time the
system is powered on or re-booted. Some systems provide a clock function so that the
system can be checked automatically at user specified time intervals;
Stop the system, provide a visual and audible warning, and wait for user directions if
a potential virus is detected; and,
Display the names of all programs or system areas that have become infected.
3. Infection Identification Products
Identify and remove multiple virus strains;
Provide information to allow the user to determine the diagnosis accuracy. Modified
viruses can sometimes only be detected by cross referencing many different
characteristics. The product should provide the degree of certainty, or other
information that can be used to determine a course of action, for any questionable
virus
;
Identify and report infected system areas and the extent of infection;
Inform the user of the anticipated degree of success for removal. Depending on the
length of time since infection, removal may or may not be possible. The product should
inform the user of possible options including automatic removal or erasure of the
affected system element;
Scan and remove infection from all attached devices including floppies, fixed and
removable hard disks, and tape devices;
Automatically scan all subdirectories;
Flag all system areas where removal was incomplete. These areas must be manuallv dealt
with after the program finishes; and,
Prevent self infection during the identification and removal process. An infected
identification product will run the risk of infecting every system on which it is used.
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E. ANTI-VIRAL PRODUCT EVALUA'I )N PROCEDURES
The test procedures in the sections below are recommended by John
McAfee at CVIA. While not scientifically rigid, they will provide additional
performance information not otherwise obtainable. Any product that
performs well in testing will provide some degree of real protection.
1. Infection Prevention Products
• Install the antiviral product;
• Test the product's ability to protec Jeneral executable programs from being modified.
Create a temporary subdirectory and r your word processor into it. Create two output
text files named TEST, one with a . extension and the other with a .COM extension.
Then attempt to update the file usir.^ ne word processor. The antiviral program should
flag both the creation and the update as a potential infection. Repeat these steps for
the system files (IBMBI0.COM, IBMD0S.COM, and C0MMAND.COM) as well as all device
drivers. Repeat each of these steps using a floppy diskette as the output device,
instead of the hard disk subdirectory. The same results should occur.
• Test the product's ability to prevent interrupt level I/O. First copy the FORMAT
routine to a file named TEST.COM. Run TEST and format a floppy diskette in the A or B
drive. The antiviral program should prevent the format and flag the attempt.
• Test the use of operating system commands. User commands are frequently, and
erroneously, flagged bv antiviral products when they instigate operations that mimic
virus activities. Usir<? COPY, DELETE and RENAME commands, copy an executable program
into a different directory, rename it to another EXE or COM file name, and then delete
it. None of the three operations should be flagged by the antiviral program.
• Verify that the above functions would be stopped if performed by a program, rather than
by the user. Using any application utility program that has cony, rename and delete
functions
, repeat the above series of steps. The antiviral pr- n should prevent and
flag all three attempts as potential viral activities.
• Test self modification. Many programs modify their own executable modules a some
point. The antiviral program should not flag or prevent this. To test this, cot your
word processor executable module to a backup file. Then run the word processor, create
a dummy document, and then save it to the name of the executable word processor module.
The antiviral program should allow the modification. After this test, copy the saved
version of the program back to its original name.
• Test for detection of boot sector modification. Using any utility that allows reading
and writing the boot sector, read the boot sector and write down the contents of the
first byte. Change the first byte to 00 and a ; : empt to write the sector back to disk.
The product should prevent the attempt. If » product fails, replace the original
contents of the first byte and re-write the boot sector. The re-write should be
performed prior to shutting down or re-booting the system.
• Teat for memory residence. Many viruses modify the original structure of programs so
that they remain memory resident after they terminate. The antiviral product should
detect any attempt to remain resident. To test this feature, merely take any normally
memory resident program, such as SIDEKICK or CACHE, and rename it to the file TEST.C0M
(or .EXE, depending on the program). Run TEST. The product should catch the program and
display a warning message.
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2. Infection Detection Products
Test for detection of boot sector replacement. Using a disk utility, create a safe
unique boot sector by blanking out the "Boot Failure" message. Then install the
detection product you wish to test. Next, replace the entire boot sector using the SYS
command. Then execute the check function of the product you are testing. The product
should warn that the new boot sector is a replacement.
Test for detection of boot modification. Next, re- install the detection product. Then
modify the boot sector randomly using the disk utility. Run the check routine. The
product should warn that the boot sector has been modified. (When finished with this
step, perform the SYS command again, or use the disk utility to return the boot sector
to its original state).
Test for detection of program deletion. Copy a number of COM and EXE files to a
temporary directory and then delete the originals. Run the detection check function.
The product should identify each of the missing programs.
Test for detection of program modification. Copy the programs back from the temporar\
directory to their original directories. Using your disk utility, modify the first byte
of each of the COM programs. Modify the entire first 500 bytes of the EXE programs.
Run the check program. Each modification should be detected. At this point you should
replace each of the modified programs from the original programs stored in the
temporary directory.
Test for detection of program replacement. Replace an application program with the
original from the distribution diskette. Then modify the program as above. The check
function should still catch the modification.
Test for detection of system modification. Using a disk utility, copy IBMBI0.COM,
IBMD0S.COM, and C0MMAND.COM to backup files. Randomly modify each of the original
files, using the disk utility, by changing only one byte in each. Run the check routine
to determine that the modifications have been detected. Perform this step multiple
times with different modifications.
3. Infection Identification Products
The first steps are to isolate the infected system from all others, and to acquire
clean, original copies of the infected programs. Make working copies of these
uninfected programs onto separate floppy diskettes, one sample program per diskette.
Insert each floppy in turn into the infected system and run each sample program. This,
in most cases, will cause the diskette, or the program, to become infected.
Using a disk utility, do a binary compare of the infected diskette to the backup copy.
If an infection has occurred, the diskettes will differ. Separate all working copy
diskettes that have been modified by the virus and label them as infected.
Now run the identification program against each of the infected floppies. Do this on
a clean, uninfected system. The program should identify the infection on each diskette.
Next cause the program to attempt removal. Run each floppy in turn through the removal
cycle. The program should remove all of the infections.
To test that the removal worked, take the infected (and now hopefully disinfected)
diskettes and again do a binary compare against the original backup diskettes. There
should be no discrepancy.
If the program has passed the above tests, it is clearly able to identify and, at least
in test disks, remove the infection. At this point you should test its operation on the
infected system. To do this, first make a backup copy of the product. Then load the
identification program into the infected system and begin the identification and
disinfection process.
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On completion of the operation, perform a disk compare of the working disk against




The following anti-viral products are available commercially


















New York, NT 10016
McAfee Associates
4423 Cheeney Street

































P.O. Box 74 30
Boulder, CO 80306
International Security (212) 288-3101
Technologies
Enigma Logic Inc. (415) 827-5707
2151 Salvio Street, #301
Concord, CA 94565 USA

















*« md4.c -- Implementation of tlD4 Message Digest Algorithm **
«* Updated: 2/16/90 by Ronald L. Rivest **
«* (C) 1990 RSA Data Security, Inc.
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*/
/*
** To use MD4
:
**
-- Include md4 . h in your program
**
-- Declare MDstruct MD to hold the state of the digest computation.
**
-- Initialize MD using MDbegin(tMD)
**
-- For each full block (64 bytes) X you wish to proce~~ call
** MDupdate(&MD,X,512)
** (512 is the number of bits in a full block.)
**
-- For the last block (less than 64 bytes) you wish 1 cess,
** MDupdatet WID.X.n)
** where n is the number of bits in the partial block partial
** block terminates the computation, so every MD computation should
** terminate by processing a partial block, even if it has n = 0.
**
-- Message digest is available in MD.buffer[0] ... MD. buf ferf 3]
.
** (Least-significant byte of each word should be output first. )
**
-- You can print out the digest using MDprint(&MD)
•/
/* Implementation notes:
** This implementation assumes that ints are 32-bit quantities.
** If the machine stores the least-significant byte of an int in the
** least -addressed byte (VAX and 8086), then LOWBYTEFIRST should be
** set to TRUE. Otherwise (eg., SUNS), LOWBYTEFIRST should be set to
** FALSE. Note that on machines with LOWBYTEFIRST FALSE the routine
** MDupdate has a side-effect on its input array (the order of bytes
** in each word are reversed). If undesired, a MDreverse(X) call can









/* Compile-time declarations of MD4 '"magic constants'".
*/




define C2 013240474631 /* round 2 constant = sqrt(2) in octal */
define C3 015666365641 /* round 3 constant - sqrt(3) in octal */
/* C2 and C3 are froa Knuth, The Art of Programming, Volume 2
** (Seminumerical Algorithms), Second Edition (1981), Addison-Wesley.
** Table 2, page 660.
*/













/* Compile-time macro declarations for MD4 .
** Note: The ''rot 1 ' operator uses the variable ''trap''.
" It assumes tmp is declared as unsigned int , so that the >>
** operator will shift in zeros rather than extending the sign bit.
*/
define f(X,Y,Z) ( ( X&Y ) I (CX)&Z>>
define g(X,Y,Z) ((X&Y) \ ( X&Z ) 1 ( Y«tZ ) )
define h(X,Y,Z) (X"Y"Z)
define rot(X.S) ( tmp=X , ( trap< < S ) | ( tmp> x 32-S ) )
)
define f f ( A , B , C , D , l , s ) A = rot((A t- f(B,C,D) t X[i]),s)
define gg( A , B , C , D , i , s ) A = rot((A g(B,C,D) * X[i] t C2),s)
define hh( A , B , C , D , i , s ) A = rot((A < h(B,C,D) f X[i] + C3),s)
/* MDprmUMDpl
** Print message digest buffer MDp as 32 hexadecimal digits.
** Order is low-order byte of bufferfO] to high-order byte of buffer[3]
** Each byte is printed with high-order hexadecimal digit first.





{ int i , j ;






<MDp->buffer[i] >> j ) 4 OxFF);
}
/* MDbegin(MDp)
** Initialize message digest buffer MDp.





{ int i ;
MDp->buffer[0] = 10;




buffer! 3] - 13;
for (i=0;i<8;i++) MDp- > count
[
i ] = 0;
MDp- > done = 0;
}
/* MDreverse(X)
** Reverse the byte-ordering of every int in X.
** Assumes X is an array of 16 ints.
** The macro revx reverses the byte-ordering of the next word of X.
*/
define revx { t = ( *X << 16) ,' ( *X >> 16); \
*X++ = <<t k OxFFOOFFOO) >> 8) | <(t & OxOOFFOOFF) << S); }
MDreverse( X
)
unsigned long int *X;
{ register unsigned long int t;
revx; revx; revx; revx; revx; revx; revx; revx;






Update message digest buffer MDp-> buffer using
Assumes all 16 words of X are full of data.
Does not update MDp->count
.
This routine is not user-callable.
















A = 1Dp->buf fer[0]
B = MDp->buffer[l]
C = MDp->buffer[2]
D = MDp-> buffer [3]

















































B C D fsl),
,
A B C 1 fs2)
;
,
D A B 2 fs3);
,
C D A 3 fs4>;
,
B C D 4 fsl);
,
A B C 5 fs2);
,
D A B 6 fs3);
C D A 7 fs4);
,
B C D 8 fsl);
A B C 9 fs2);
,
D A B 10 fs3);
.
c D A 11 fs4>;
,
B C D 12 fsl )
.
A B C 13 fs2);
.
D A B 14 fs3);




A B C 4 gs2);
,
D A B 8 gs3);
,
c D A 12 gs4);
,
B C 1 gsl);
,
A B C 5 gs2);
,
D A B 9 gs3);
.
c D A 13 gs4)
;
,
B C D 2 gsl);
.
A B C 6 gs2);
,
D A B 10 gs3);
,
c D A 14 gs4);
,
B C D 3 gsl);
> A B C 7 gs2);
.
D A B 11 gs3);
>










A B 4 hs3);
.




c > D , 2 hsl);
.















A B C 9 hs2);
,
D A B 5 hs3);
,




c D 3 hsl);
,




A B , 7 hs3);
buffer */
/* Round 1 */
/* Round 2 */
/* Round 3 */
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MDp->buf fer[0] ••= A;
MDp->buf fer( 1] f= B;
MDp->buf fer[2] <- - C;
MDp->buf fer[3) f= D;
}
/ * MDupdatel MDp, X, count
)
" Input: MDp -- an MDptr
** X -- a pointer to an array of unsigned characters.
' ' count -- the number of bits of X to use.
11 (if not multiple of S, uses high bits of last bvte.)
' ' (pdate IDp using the number of bits of X given bv count.
1 * This is the basic input routine for an MD4 user.
'* The routine completes the ID computation when count < 512, so
** every MD computation should end with one call to MDupdate with a
"* count less than 512. A call with count will be ignored if the
* * ID has already been terminated ( done ! = ) , so an extra call with count
** can be given as a 'courtesy close' to force termination if desired.
l /
void




{ unsigned long int i, tmp, bit, byte, mask;
unsigned char XX[64];
unsigned char *p;
/* return with no error if this is a courtesy close with count
** zero and MDp->done is true.
*/
if (count = = && MDp->done) return;
/* check to see if MD is already done and report error */
if (MDp->done) { print f( " \nError : MDupdate MD already done."); return; }
/* Add count to MDp- > count */
tmp - count;
p = MDp- > count
;
whi le ( tmp )
{ tmp += *p;
*p++ = tmp;
tmp = tmp >> 3;
}
/* Process data */
if (count " 512)
{ /* Full block of data to handle */
MDblockl MDp ,( unsigned long int *)X);
}
else if (count > 512) /* Check for count too large */
{ printf
("\nError: MDupdate called with illegal count value %d.",count);
return;
}
else /» partial block -- must be last block so finish up */
{ /* Find out how many bytes and residual bits there are */
byte = count > > 3
;
bit = count & 7;
I* Copy X into XX since we need to modify it */
for (i=0;i<=byte;i++) XX[i] = X[i];
for (i=byte*l;i<64;i*+) XX[i] = 0;
/* Add padding '1' bit and low-order zeros in last byte */
mask = 1 < < ( 7 - bit )
;
XX[byte] = (XX(byte] ', mask) & "( mask - 1);
/* If room for bit count, finish up with this block */
if (byte <= 55)
{ for (i=0;i<8;i++) XX[56+i] = MDp->count [ i]
;
MDblock( MDp, ( unsigned long int *)XX);
}
else /* need to do two blocks to finish up */
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{ MDblock(MDp, ( unsigned long int *)XX);
for (i=0;i<56; i++) XX[i] = 0;
for ( i = 0; i<3; i + +) XX[56+i] = MDp- >count [ 1 J
,
MDblockfMDp, ( unsigned long int *)X.\);
}
/* Set flag saying we're done with )"1D computation «/
MDp->done = 1;
}
" End of md4.c
</
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